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1. Introduction 8 
Agriculture is commonly perceived as producing public goods and/or public bads (OECD, 9 
2001). It is well known that the presence of these may imply that government can use policy 10 
to increase aggregate welfare above that of free-market equilibrium. We focus on public 11 
goods that can be degraded beyond reversibility. An obvious example is the extinction of an 12 
endangered species, which irreversibly decreases the public good agrobiodiversity. The same 13 
holds true for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which contribute to the public bad climate 14 
change (or, equivalently, the public good emissions reductions) (IPCC, 2007). To cope with 15 
the problem of degradation beyond reversibility, Bishop (1978) developed the concept of a 16 
safe minimum standard (SMS). Our contribution focuses on the implications of SMS for 17 
agricultural and environmental policy design when public goods are complementary to each 18 
other and when public goods are in conflict with each other. We wish to explore how to 19 
balance public goods and how the nature of the public goods and public bads affect the cost 20 
of policy.  21 
Brunstad et al. (2005) showed how the complementarity of public goods potentially 22 
reduces the costs of their provision. We formalize their approach, and extend the analysis to 23 
examine conflicting public goods. The emerging trade-offs turn out to be complex, even 24 
within a rather simple welfare-theoretical model requiring numerical solutions. We illustrate 25 
 2 
our findings with the help of Jordmod, a price-endogenous model of the Norwegian 1 
agricultural sector to illustrate the essence of the theoretical model. By including the 2 
indicators for the SMS in the model’s objective function, we update and extend the model 3 
used Brunstad et al. (2005). This enables the social costs associated with the SMS to be 4 
revealed, and ensures that the SMS is achieved at minimum social cost.  5 
 6 
2. Safe minimum standards 7 
Agriculture is commonly perceived as being associated with market failures, such as can 8 
occur in the presence of positive or negative externalities and public goods (OECD, 2001). 9 
We offer three examples of public goods related to agricultural activity: (national) food 10 
security, agrobiodiversity, and reductions of GHG emissions.  11 
We define a safe minimum standard (SMS) as a requirement to maintain a public good at 12 
a level robust against irreversible degradation.1 By incorporating absolute minimum limits on 13 
the level of the public good in an applied partial equilibrium model for agriculture, we have 14 
assumed that the costs of complying with the SMS criterion are acceptable irrespective of the 15 
public good’s level. To estimate the implicit social costs of applying the SMS criterion we 16 
calculate the endogenous shadow price resulting from the corresponding constraint in the 17 
economic model. Simultaneously setting SMSs for several public goods permits us to 18 
conduct an integrated assessment of the effects of the various public goods on social costs.  19 
In a seminal paper, Bishop (1978: 13) developed the SMS concept to cope with the 20 
problem of degradation beyond reversibility. The paper fostered a vast literature that aimed to 21 
refine and critically discuss the SMS concept as a rule for environment policy and sustainable 22 
development (e.g., Randall 1991; Rolfe, 1995; Farmer and Randall, 1998). Standard methods 23 
of economic valuation, such as the contingent valuation method and travel cost method, 24 
                                                          
1 In the general framework and the theoretical model, we turn the safe minimum standards of public goods into 
maximum limits to ease notation and interpretation of the corresponding shadow values.  
 3 
involve substantial methodological and theoretical shortcomings (Nyborg, 2000). For 1 
example, as they may regard it as their basic right, it would seem quite strange to ask people 2 
for their willingness-to-pay for food security. Perman et al. (2003) claimed that, in addition to 3 
scientific uncertainty about nature’s threshold limits, there may also exist social and scientific 4 
ignorance regarding the future usefulness and value of the public good. Hediger and Knickel 5 
(2009) argued for the use of SMSs as a precautionary measure to assure that an economic 6 
system does not move beyond the boundary of its “sustainability space.”  7 
A common criticism of the SMS criterion is that it is too conservative because it places 8 
excessive weight on the potential costs from irreversible depletion and disregards the 9 
potential benefits of the project it requires to cease. Any method that compares marginal costs 10 
and marginal benefits, e.g., cost-benefit analysis, does not solve the principle problem of 11 
irreversible depletion. If the lowest total cost of meeting the SMS constraint is deemed 12 
excessive, policy makers could reject the constraint, and let the public good be at risk of 13 
irreversible degradation. Policy makers need to judge what cost level is excessive to have a 14 
robust level of a given public good (Perman, 2003: 462).  15 
Brunstad et al. (2005) used an earlier version of the sector model Jordmod to assess the 16 
complementarity between two public goods by incorporating an approach to measure 17 
society’s willingness to pay for cultural landscape and a food security SMS. We use an 18 
illustrative welfare-theoretical model with an updated and improved version of Jordmod to 19 
extend Brunstad et al.’s (2005) analysis, and illustrate trade-offs between potentially 20 
conflicting public goods  21 
 22 
3. Theoretical model  23 
In this section, we first present a general framework for analysing the effects of policies 24 
towards public goods and bads when factor and output prices are endogenous. The basic 25 
 4 
insights are then illustrated in a welfare theoretical context using comparative statics to 1 
analyse the effects of a marginal change in the levels of the SMS on the welfare of different 2 
interest groups, the prices of goods, and the shadow prices of the public goods.  3 
 4 
3.1 General framework   5 
Consider a polity in which government uses policy to ensure that some number of public 6 
goods do not fall below their SMS levels.2 For illustrative purposes, consider said 7 
government to have available two policy instruments, s1 and s2, which affect the levels of two 8 
public goods G, H, each with its corresponding (SMS) level g and h. In market equilibrium, 9 
the levels of the public goods depend on the levels set for the policy instruments; we denote 10 
these functional relationships G(s1, s2) and H(s1, s2). The SMSs require G(s1, s2) ≥ g and H(s1, 11 
s2) ≥ h.   12 
The levels set for the policy instruments also affect social welfare derived in private 13 
markets (for example, producer and consumer surplus from buying and selling private goods, 14 
not from consuming public goods). We use WM(s1, s2) to denote how social welfare from 15 
market activities (that is, not including the welfare effects of the public goods G and H) 16 
depend on policy. Similarly, WG(G) and WH(H) show how social welfare is affected by the 17 
levels of the public goods G and H. For simplicity, we assume that total social welfare is 18 
separable in market activity and public goods: 19 
(1) , 20 
where WJ ≥ 0 and ∂WJ/∂J > 0, for J = G, H. 21 
                                                          
2 It will prove notationally convenient and help with our intuitive interpretations to convert “public bads” into 
“public goods” by subtracting the levels of the public bads from constants. In general, if we let h´ be the level of 
a public bad (pollution, say), then we can consider the level of the corresponding public good as h = hmax – h´, 
were hmax is just some maximum level of the public bad that can occur.   
W s1,s2( ) ºW
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 5 
We assume that setting a policy instrument’s level at zero implies that the instrument is 1 
not used, and that an increase in the level of the instrument implies its increased use. The 2 
policy objective is to maximize social welfare without violating the SMSs: 3 
(2) ,
 
4 
where  and  and are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the SMSs. If the policy (s1*, 5 
s2
*) = s* solves the maximization problem, then under the conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker 6 
theorem there exist two numbers *, and * such that the following conditions are satisfied:  7 
Eq. (a) (b) (c) 
(3) 
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 8 
In the table, Gi = ∂G/∂si, and Hi = ∂H/∂si, for i = 1, 2, and * and * represent the marginal 9 
social benefits (costs) of loosening (tightening) the SMSs g and h. Since both G and H are 10 
public goods, they increase social welfare: WG´ > 0, WH´ > 0. Because by conditions (5b) and 11 
(6b) the Lagrangian multipliers must be nonnegative, we conclude that the terms 12 
 and are both positive. From (3c) and (4c), if W1
M < 13 
0, G1 < 0, and H1 < 0 for all s, then the solution to the maximization problem is to set the 14 
levels of both instruments at zero:  s1
* = s2
* = 0. The intuition is that if raising the level of 15 
instrument s1 always lowers market-based welfare and always lowers the levels of the public 16 
goods, then there is no reason to use the policy instruments—raising their values makes 17 
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everything worse. Similarly, if raising the instrument s1 always raises market-based welfare 1 
and always raises the levels to the public goods, then (3c) and (4c) imply that higher values of 2 
the policy instrument are always better, and so there is no solution to the maximization 3 
problem. For the problem at hand to be interesting, therefore, there must be values of the 4 
policy instruments at which raising their levels leads to both benefits in some parts of the 5 
economy and losses in other parts. Given that the conditions hold that result in an interior 6 
solution to the maximization problem, conditions (3c) – (6c) imply a system of identities:  7 
(7) 
,
 8 
For notational brevity, let 9 
(8)  10 
Differentiating (8) with respect to g and putting the results into matrix form, we get, 11 
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 7 
Equation (10) shows how the marginal benefit of loosening the SMS on H is affected by 1 
marginally loosening the SMS on G, given that it is safe to do so. If loosening the SMS on G 2 
raises the marginal social benefit of loosening the SMS on H, (that is, if ∂*/∂g > 0), then we 3 
say that the two SMSs are complements. If ∂*/∂g < 0, then loosening the SMS on G lowers 4 
the marginal social benefit of loosening the SMS on H, and we say that the two SMSs 5 
conflict.   6 
To better understand intuitively the forces that drive SMS conflict or complementarity, 7 
consider the case in which increased use of either policy instrument increases the level of 8 
each public good: G1, G2, H1, H2 > 0, but creates deadweight in markets: W1
M < 0, W2
M < 0. 9 
Furthermore, assume that the marginal deadweight from using si increases as its level of use 10 
increases: Wii
M < 0 for i = 1,2. (This might occur, for example, because the Harberger 11 
triangles get bigger at a “faster” rate as use of the instrument rises). Also assume that 12 
marginal production of public goods is falling in the use of the instruments, Gii < 0 and Hii < 13 
0 for i = 1, 2. Under these conditions, the definition in (8) implies that Wii < 0 for i = 1, 2. 14 
Assume also that the cross derivatives are positive: Gij > 0, Hij > 0, and Wij
M > 0 for i ≠ j. 15 
Then increased use of si increases the marginal return of sj in the creation of public goods, 16 
and lowers the market-derived deadweight loss from a marginal increase in sj. Under these 17 
conditions, we have Wij > 0 for i ≠ j, and so, from (11), we have ∂*/∂g > 0: the SMSs are 18 
complementary regulations.  19 
 20 
3.2 Illustration: Effects of a marginal change of the SMS of public good G  21 
Equation (10) makes clear that even in this simple framework the specific parameterization of 22 
the market characteristics and the functional forms of the relationships among social welfare 23 
and public goods determine whether public goods are conflicting or complementary. Using a 24 
 8 
welfare-theoretical model, we illustrate the intuition behind equation (10) by deriving 1 
comparative static results of a marginal change of the SMS of public good G.  2 
Consider an economy with two agricultural inputs, a and b. Say that there are two policy 3 
instruments available to the government, per-unit subsidies sa and sb. When a is produced or 4 
used, jointly some other public good G is produced according to the relationship G = . 5 
In our example, this public good might be “food security”, which will be further discussed in 6 
section 4.2. Similarly, when b is used in agricultural production, jointly some other public 7 
good H is produced according to the relationship H = . Input b might be permanent 8 
grassland for forage production. The public good that accompanies the use of b might be 9 
“agrobiodiversity”, which will be further discussed in section 4.2. Initially, assume that the 10 
public goods’ SMS levels are g´ and h´. The relationship between the market equilibrium 11 
quantities of the two goods and policy are described by functions a(sa, sb) and b(sa, sb). It 12 
follows that G(sa, sb)   and similarly H(sa, sb)  .  As depicted, to 13 
maintain g at g´, the equilibrium quantity of a must be maintained at a´, and to maintain H 14 
and h´, the quantity of b must be maintained at b´. The policy (sa
0, sb
0) results in quantities 15 
that satisfy these SMSs. We assume in figure 1 that in the production process that uses inputs 16 
a and b, the inputs are neither substitutes nor complements. That is, a change in the price of 17 
input a does not affect demand for input b, nor vice-versa. This assumption is relaxed below. 18 
Still, the prices of a and b, Pa and Pb, may change endogenously due to changes in SMS 19 
levels. Figure 1 illustrates the effects on *, the marginal social value of public good H, when 20 
the government is able to safely relax the SMS on G by a marginal amount. To see this, 21 
consider that it is safe for the SMS of G to be reduced by ∆g. The looser constraint allows the 22 
government to lower the subsidy rate on a from sa
0 to sa
1. This raises the demand price for a 23 
from pa
d0 to pa
d1, and lowers the supply price from pa
s0 to pa
s1. The resultant loss in profits of 24 
the firms that use input a are illustrated by the shaded trapezoid ∆CSa (Just, Hueth, and 25 
 9 
Schmitz 2004, pp. 59-60). Similarly, the resultant loss in the profits of the suppliers of input a 1 
is the shaded trapezoid ∆PSa (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004, pp. 52-54). Taxes to finance the 2 
subsidy in the market for a can also be lowered, and so taxpayers save the thick-bordered 3 
region ∆TSa. 4 
 5 
Figure 1. The effect of a marginal change in SMS g on market welfare, given that the SMS 6 
level of h is maintained at h´, and assuming inputs a and b are neither substitutes nor 7 
complements in production of a final good 8 
 9 
Summing the changes in welfare derived from the production, selling, buying and 10 
consumption of the private goods, the aggregate gain is the cross-hatched trapezoid. This is 11 
approximately equal to the marginal benefit of being able to safely relax g times the drop in 12 
g, labeled *∆g. Intuitively, this is how much the original Harberger deadweight triangle 13 
 10 
could be reduced because the subsidy sa could be lowered from sa
0 to sa
1 when it became 1 
possible to safely lower the SMS from g´ to g´- ∆g.  2 
In figure 1, using one policy instrument does not affect the marginal social return of using 3 
the other policy instrument. The cross-price derivatives of the input demand functions are 4 
assumed to be zero. Nor, since h remains unchanged, is there a change in the social welfare in 5 
this market associated with the ability to relax g. Hence, ∂*/∂g = 0. The two public goods 6 
are neither complementary nor in conflict. 7 
Figure 2 represents the case of a marginal change of the SMS g assuming that inputs a 8 
and b are substitutes. Therefore the cross-derivatives in equation (10) are not zero.  9 
 10 
Figure 2. Effect on social welfare of a marginal change in g given h’ and assuming 11 
substitution between a and b 12 
 13 
 11 
In this case, being able to safely lower g by ∆g allows not only a reduction in the per-unit 1 
subsidy on a, but a reduction in the per-unit subsidy on b as well. The demand price for a 2 
rises and shifts out the demand curve for b. The outward shift increases the demand price for 3 
b, and so shifts out the demand for a. In the new equilibrium, the SMSs g´-∆g and h´ can be 4 
brought about with smaller-per unit subsidies: sa
1 < sa
0 and sb
1 < sb
0. The reduced subsidy on 5 
a raises the demand price from pa
d0 to pa
d1, and lowers the supply price from pa
s0 to pa
s1. 6 
Producer surplus in market a is lowered by the shaded area ∆PSa. Taxpayers save the thick-7 
bordered area ∆TSa. We show in the appendix that the drop in the profits of the users of 8 
inputs a and b caused by the increase of the input demand prices can be measured by shaded 9 
area Y plus the shaded area Z. In market b, taxpayers save ∆TSb, which is equal to area Z. 10 
The welfare of suppliers of input b does not change since the producer price stays constant at 11 
pb
s0. In sum, the rise in aggregate welfare is the cross-hatched trapezoid, approximately equal 12 
to –**∆g. 13 
Finally, consider the change in aggregate welfare due to the loosening of the SMS on g if 14 
the initial SMS on h had been higher, namely at h´´ instead of at h´ (figure 3).  15 
 12 
 1 
Figure 3. Effect on social welfare of a marginal change in g given h’’ > h’ and assuming 2 
substitution between a and b 3 
 4 
With the SMS in market b at the higher level, h´´, the relaxation of the other SMS by ∆g 5 
increases social welfare by approximately –***∆g, as represented by the cross-hatched 6 
trapezoid. Note that this trapezoid is larger than the corresponding one in figure 2, labeled –7 
**∆g. In this illustration, the more restrictive is one SMS, the more beneficial is loosening 8 
the other SMS. The reason is fundamentally tied to the substitutability between the two 9 
inputs. In either market, deadweight is incurred when a marginal unit of the input is produced 10 
at a marginal cost greater than the marginal benefit of its demand. The difference between the 11 
heights of the supply and demand curves in this market at that particular quantity of the good 12 
is the marginal social deadweight from the production and consumption of the inputs. For 13 
example, the more of good b is required by the SMS, the lower will be the marginal benefit of 14 
 13 
consuming another unit of a, since a and b are substitutes. Thus, if the SMS of h, which is 1 
brought about by b, is raised, more b must be consumed, and the lower is the marginal benefit 2 
of consuming a. Therefore, when the restriction on a is loosened, the marginal gain to society 3 
is larger than it would have been if the SMS in market b had not been forcing additional 4 
consumption of b on consumers.  5 
 6 
4. Modelling public goods in Jordmod 7 
The analysis above shows that whether two or more public goods are complements or in 8 
conflict depends on the specific values of the model’s parameters. For that reason, we 9 
illustrate these outcomes in Jordmod, a numerical model of the Norwegian agriculture sector 10 
which allows the endogenous determination of the marginal costs of achieving SMSs. 11 
 12 
4.1 Model overview  13 
Jordmod is a price-endogenous, spatial, comparative-static, and partial equilibrium model for 14 
the Norwegian agricultural sector in the tradition of Takayama and Judge (1971). It consists 15 
of two modules: a supply module and a market module. The supply module comprises 16 
optimization models for farms and for the food industry. The farm optimization models 17 
generate input-output coefficients for eleven farm types in thirty-two regions by maximizing 18 
farm income. The maximization procedure is subject to fixed input and output prices, 19 
Leontief technology for intermediate inputs, non-linear cost functions for labour and capital, 20 
and subsidies with partly non-linear payment rates. The responses of cereals and grass yields 21 
to nitrogen inputs are modelled as non-linear, as is the relationship between milk yields and 22 
feed mix. We examined the use of two types of policy instruments: payments which are 23 
(partially) regionally differentiated to compensate for unfavourable natural conditions, and 24 
sometimes have successively lower rates to counter economies of scale, and commodity 25 
 14 
policies such as milk quotas. There are further constraints on agronomic practices (e.g., feed 1 
requirements, crop rotation and nutrient needs). Data are taken from the economic accounts 2 
(BFJ, div.) and farm account statistics (NILF, div.).  3 
The food industry optimization models minimize total industry costs subject to volume 4 
and regional distribution of raw commodities, transport costs between farms and plants, and 5 
processing costs at the plants. Models are set up for the dairy industry and the meat industry. 6 
Firms process raw commodities into 41 products for final demand. This setup reflects the 7 
close connection between primary agriculture and the food industry. It also allows for a 8 
detailed representation of trade and trade policies at the processing stage of the food value 9 
chain. Except for the cases of dairy products and meat, fixed processing margins are applied 10 
for final demand. 11 
The market module consists of 41 final markets. The supply part of the final markets 12 
consists of identical farms for each type and region, as well as food industry firms. The 13 
number of farms and firms is determined in equilibrium. Final demand enters through linear 14 
demand functions that are calibrated to base year levels for each of five market regions 15 
aggregated from the production regions. Trade in raw commodities and in final goods occurs 16 
between the market regions and the rest of the world at fixed world market prices. Net trade 17 
between the world market and the market regions takes place in the presence of trade policies 18 
such as import tariffs, import quotas and export subsidies. 19 
As will be explained below, the SMSs are modelled as constraints to the model’s 20 
overall objective function. If binding, the marginal costs of tightening the SMSs (or marginal 21 
benefits of loosening them) can be inferred directly from the respective shadow prices in the 22 
model’s dual solution. If not binding, an SMS imposes no constraint on the economy, and no 23 
costs are borne to meet it. In the current approach, we impose the SMSs at the national level, 24 
with the exception of one of the agrobiodiversity indicators, which we apply at the regional 25 
 15 
level. Equilibrium in all markets is found by maximizing the sector’s aggregate welfare. In 1 
principle, the overall solution is found in an iterative process between the supply module and 2 
the market module, by which information on output prices and quantities from the market 3 
module are used to update the optimization models in the supply module. In the current 4 
approach, only one iterative step was required. The model’s base year is 2006.  5 
 6 
4.2 Defining safe minimum standards in Jordmod 7 
4.2.1 SMS for food security 8 
According to the FAO, “food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and 9 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 10 
preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 1996). For a developed country like 11 
Norway, monetary access to food as well as the food’s quality is of minor concern. Defining 12 
a safe minimum standard becomes merely a matter of calculating the level of natural and 13 
human resources necessary to secure adequate food availability and composition in case of a 14 
temporary disruption in foreign food supplies.  15 
We calculate the SMS for national food security as depending on the quantities of energy, 16 
protein, and fat that Norwegian agriculture would need to generate in the case of an 17 
international crisis that cut off imported food supplies to the country (Brunstad et al., 2005).  18 
Based on the predicted composition of age and gender in the Norwegian population in 2020 19 
(Statistics Norway, 2011), Following the Food and Nutrition Board (2002), we assign the 20 
values 2360 kcal/day3, 38 g/day4, and 22 g/day5 as the minimum daily individual food 21 
requirements for energy, protein and fat (table 1). Then we subtract from these estimates the 22 
per-capita amounts of energy, protein, and fat that Norway could provide to its citizens from 23 
domestic seafood production and domestic grain stocks. The latter two food sources are 24 
                                                          
3 Estimated Average Requirement (EAR) 
4 Estimated Average Requirement (EAR) 
5 Lower end of Adequate Macronutrient Distribution Range (AMDR) 
 16 
exogenous to the model and account for twenty-three percent of the energy requirement, 1 
seventy-two percent of the fat requirement, and the entire protein requirement. The remaining 2 
difference is the required “crisis food production” in Norway.  3 
 4 
Table 1. Safe minimum standard for national food security (“crisis menu”) 5 
 Energya Proteina Fata 
Requirement 2 360 38.00 22.00 
Seafood 284 38.68 14.33 
Grain stocks 267 8.12 1.43 
Crisis food production 1 809 0.00 6.24 
a kcal per capita and day for energy, g per capita and day for protein and fat 6 
Source: Own calculations based on Food and Nutrition Board (2002), Norwegian Food 7 
Safety Authority (2011) and FAO (2011) 8 
 9 
Our approach improves upon Brunstad et al. (2005) as we explicitly take into account that 10 
available resources can be turned into nutrient-providing activities in case of a crisis. We 11 
value the national resource base for its potential nutrient provision, not its observed 12 
provision. For example, arable land is associated with the same yield-based potential nutrient 13 
provision coefficient, independent of the crop currently observed planted. Current and 14 
potential nutrient provision from animal-based food is identical since we abstract from the 15 
possibility of building up animal herds.  16 
The indicator for the food security SMS, FS, is defined as the smallest value of the three 17 
nutrient level sub-indicators:  18 
𝐹𝑆 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
𝑒
𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑒
 ,
𝑝
𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑝
 ,
𝑓
𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑓
  },  19 
where 𝑒, 𝑝 and 𝑓 stand for energy, protein and fat. Food security is obtained when FS ≥ 1, 20 
that is, when the consumption of all three nutrients are at least as great as their SMSs, and 21 
 17 
therefore all citizens are fully nourished. The indicator allows for full substitution at the 1 
nutrient level (“one calorie is one calorie”), regardless of food source. However, no 2 
substitution across nutrients (“one calorie is not one unit of fat”) can help achieve the SMS.6  3 
The availability of each nutrient 𝑚  {e, p, f} for consumption in a crisis is, 4 
𝑚 =  ∑ 𝑎𝑚
𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑖 + 𝑆𝐹𝑚 +  𝐺𝑆𝑚 5 
where 𝑎𝑚
𝑖  is the per-unit potential provision of nutrient 𝑚 from activity i = 1, …, I, and 6 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑖 is the current level of activity i. 𝑆𝐹𝑚 and 𝐺𝑆𝑚 is the provision of nutrient 𝑚 from 7 
seafood and grain stocks, respectively.  8 
 9 
4.2.2. SMS for agrobiodiversity 10 
Although there is a large literature on agrobiodiversity indicators (Feld et al. 2009, Büchs 11 
2003), only a few examples exist in which such indicators have been implemented in large-12 
scale agricultural sector models. A main obstacle is that many models operate at most at the 13 
regional level whereas the measurement of agrobiodiversity requires site-specificity (Britz 14 
and Heckelei 2008). Notable exceptions include Verboom et al. (2007) and Britz et al. 15 
(2011), which feature indicators calculated ex post. In our approach, we do not overcome the 16 
problem of site-specificity, but the indicators are part of the model’s objective function and 17 
affect the equilibrium solution.  18 
 19 
                                                          
6 This holds particularly for calories and protein. It seems that a fat consumption somewhat beneath the lower 
end of the AMDR can be compensated by a higher energy intake. However, if the compensation consists of 
carbohydrates, such a diet increases health risks (Food and Nutrition Board, 2002). 
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Table 2. Definition of indicators for agrobiodiversity  1 
Indicator Definition Description 
Semi-natural grassland 
(SGr)  
Semi-natural grassland 
in ha in region r relative 
to SMS in r 
High Nature Value 
Farmland (HNVF) 
 
Units of High Nature Value 
Farmland, share i: share of 
crop group i= {c, f, o}a 
Landscape diversity 
(LD)b  
Share j: share of crop j 
on all 12 potential crop 
activities on arable land 
Ruminant density 
(RD)b  
LU: unit of ruminants, 
AREA: total fodder area 
in ha Nitrogen surplus for 
crop group i(NSi)
b 
 
N surplusi in kg ha
-1, 
i = {c,f,o}a 
ac: cereals, f: fodder, o: other arable crops 2 
b Sub-indicator for HNVF 3 
 4 
Norwegian agrobiodiversity has weakened, both quantitatively in terms losses in 5 
agrobiodiverse-rich land area, and qualitatively as the remaining areas are less rich in 6 
agrobiodiversity. Flowery meadows are a particular type of agrobiodiversity rich-area, which 7 
have been threatened by the overgrowth of forest caused by reduced or abandoned 8 
agricultural activity. Another threat has been the intensification of chemical input use in 9 
remaining agricultural areas (DirNat, 2010). Hietala-Koivu et al. (2004) underlined the 10 
importance of semi-natural areas for the agrobiodiversity of agricultural landscapes. Their 11 
agrobiodiversity depends on agricultural activities like mowing and grazing (Olsson and 12 
Rønningen, 1999).  Table 2 reports how we quantify the state of biodiversity using two 13 
indicators. The first is the model’s area in semi-natural grassland. This indicator is 14 
regionalized. The level of the SMS in region r is set to region r’s base year level of semi-15 
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natural grassland. The second indicator measures High Nature Value Farmland (HNVF) 1 
assessing the relationship between certain types of farming and their environmental outcomes 2 
in terms of biodiversity, habitats, and rural landscapes (Eurostat 2015). The formal 3 
calculation of the indicator is based on Paracchini and Britz (2007). The HNVF indicator is 4 
composed of sub-indicators for cereals, other arable crops and fodder. The sub-indicators are 5 
calculated for each region and turned into a national value using the regions’ shares. Building 6 
on the idea that agrobiodiversity increases with a richer crop composition and lower nitrogen 7 
surpluses, the contribution of cereals is defined as the product of landscape diversity (LD) 8 
and nitrogen surplus on cereals (NSc). The contribution of fodder takes into account ruminant 9 
density (RD) and nitrogen surpluses in fodder (NSf) production. It assumes that HNVF is 10 
positively correlated with a decrease in RD and a reduction of NSf. For other arable crops, 11 
only nitrogen surpluses NSo are considered. The overall HNVF indicator is defined as the sum 12 
of the three indicators for cereals, other arable crops and fodder weighted with their 13 
respective national shares. The SMS is set to the national level in the base year, and the 14 
indicator is defined as the actual national level of HNVF divided by the national level 15 
required by the SMS. This definition allows for some flexibility between regions and between 16 
the three sub-indicators.  17 
 18 
4.2.3. SMS for GHG emissions  19 
The Norwegian agricultural sector is responsible for twelve percent of the national GHG 20 
emissions, but only 0.3 percent of GDP. The main sources are methane from the metabolisms 21 
of ruminant animals, nitrous oxide from fertilizer and animal manure, and the release of 22 
carbon from the ground when fields and marshlands are ploughed (Trømborg et al., 2007). 23 
Total Norwegian GHG emissions account for less than 0.5 percent of global emissions 24 
levels (UNFCCC, 2011), and reducing GHG emissions from Norwegian agriculture would 25 
 20 
have an insignificant impact on the earth’s climate. Implementing a safe minimum standard 1 
to sustain global emissions levels would thus be meaningless. However, reducing GHG 2 
emissions from Norwegian agriculture could be a by-product of making the economy more 3 
efficient (Blandford et al., 2010). If there were attributed no value to the public goods 4 
generated in agriculture, then the value of the sector would, consist of of little else than the 5 
market value of the food production. In this case, reducing national emissions from 6 
agriculture could come at a negative social cost. The government could simply reduce its 7 
subsidies, and the overall result would be lower national GHG emissions and a more efficient 8 
economy. 9 
In order to avoid emissions leakages and achieve complete internalization of a potential 10 
carbon price for all Norwegian food consumption, we extend the reduction commitment to 11 
food imports and feed imports. Emissions related to food imports are taken from Britz and 12 
Witzke (2011), while emissions related to feed imports (soybean meal) are from Dalgaard et 13 
al. (2008).  Further, we implement two alternative GHG emissions reduction approaches:  14 
- ‘Emissions cap’ assumes a twenty percent reduction of agricultural GHG emissions 15 
from base year levels. The reduction rate is the same as for other sectors and based 16 
on Norway’s official commitment.  17 
-  ‘Emissions tax’ assumes a tax of 350 NOK per ton CO2-equivalent, which roughly 18 
corresponds to the upper limit of market analysts’ (CCC, 2009) expected 2020 quota 19 
price range for the EU CO2-emissions permit scheme.  20 
We define the indicator for GHG emissions as GHG = LEVE/SMSE, where LEVLE and 21 
SMSE are defined as the current GHG emissions level and GHG emissions level required by 22 
the SMS. SMSE is defined as eighty percent of base year GHG emissions levels from 23 
domestic food production, food imports and feed imports. This means that total emissions 24 
reductions will be the sum of emissions reductions from the Norwegian agricultural sector 25 
 21 
and carbon leakage through imports. The indicator takes values between zero and infinity. It 1 
will be unity if GHG emissions are reduced to the level of the SMS. Lower (higher) values 2 
indicate that actual GHG emissions are lower (higher) than the level of the SMS.  3 
 4 
5. Scenarios examined in Jordmod 5 
The baseline is constructed as a continuation of current policies (i.e., subsidies, milk quotas 6 
and tariffs) and other trends affecting the agricultural sector. The model’s simulation year is 7 
2020. Values of exogenous variables are projected based on historic trends and available 8 
forecasts7.  9 
The results of the theoretical model show that SMSs influence each other under certain 10 
conditions. We elaborate this point by defining three scenarios for each of the emissions cap 11 
and emissions tax approaches to GHG emissions: (1) food security (FS), (2) agrobiodiversity 12 
(BD), and (3) food security and biodiversity combined (FSBD). This gives a total of six 13 
scenarios in addition to the baseline. Contrary to the baseline, current import tariffs and 14 
subsidies are set to zero in the six scenarios. The model then generates shadow prices of the 15 
SMSs in the absence of support. These shadow prices will indicate the undisturbed least-cost 16 
payment rates necessary to achieve the SMSs, illustrating what a least-cost support system in 17 
the scenarios would look like.  18 
 19 
6. Selected results 20 
This section presents the simulation results of the modelling exercise. First, we report the 21 
levels of the public goods and bads under the different policy scenarios, paying particular 22 
attention to which SMSs bind and which do not. We then present the corresponding shadow 23 
                                                          
7 Trend growth per annum in important exogenous variables: Inflation: 2.5 % (Statistics Norway, 2010). 
Population growth: 1 % (Statistics Norway, 2010). Real interest rate: 1.9 % (Statistics Norway, 2010). Nominal 
world market prices: 1.0 – 5.0 % (OECD and FAO, 2011). Technical progress (input savings) at farm level 
(except labour, capital and N needs, which are endogenously determined: 0.5 % (own assumptions). Technical 
progress at food industry level: 1.0 % (own assumption). 
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prices and discuss these in the light of the results from the theoretical model. We discuss how 1 
the simultaneous satisfaction of the SMSs of food security and agrobiodiversity affects GHG 2 
emissions from domestic production and imports. Finally, we examine how the various parts 3 
of the agricultural sector adapt to the imposition of SMSs, and the implications for production 4 
and social welfare. 5 
In table 3 we report the values of the indicators for food security, agrobiodiversity and 6 
GHG emissions under the six scenarios. The baseline illustrates that a continuation of current 7 
policies will lead to cases of undersupply and of oversupply of the various public goods, 8 
relative to the SMS. The food security requirement is highly overshot, ninety percent above 9 
the SMS, indicating that the public good is supplied at excessive social cost. Regarding 10 
agrobiodiversity, semi-natural grassland is slightly undersupplied (0.99 in table 3), while the 11 
level of High Nature Value Farmland farmland is at 1.05, and thus above the SMS of unity. 12 
Finally, GHG emissions increase to over thirty percent above the level of the SMS (1.31 in 13 
table 3). These results imply that if satisfying the SMSs is a main purpose of the Norwegian 14 
government’s intervention in agriculture, policies are clearly misspecified. 15 
In all six scenarios, GHG emissions fall from the baseline value of 1.31. Under the carbon 16 
cap, the SMS is not binding, and the emissions tax proves to be higher than necessary to 17 
achieve the reduction requirement. The required GHG emissions reductions are hence not in 18 
conflict with maintaining food security and/or agrobiodiversity in the current state of the 19 
Norwegian agricultural sector. This particular result is driven by the values set for the SMSs. 20 
One can easily imagine that GHG emissions reductions would eventually conflict with the 21 
two other public goods, if the reduction requirement were sufficiently strengthened. The 22 
emissions in FSBD are significantly higher than in scenarios FS and BD. Moving from 23 
scenario FS (BD) to FSBD is thus an example of tightening an SMS on biodiversity (food 24 
security), as discussed in section 3. Since the tightening of the SMS in FSBD relative to FS or 25 
 23 
BD leads to an increase in GHG emissions, there are conflicts between GHG emissions 1 
reductions and each of the public goods food security biodiversity.  2 
 3 
Table 3. Policy indicators by scenario  4 
 
 
Baseline Emissions cap Emissions tax 
 FSa BDa FSBDa FSa BDa FSBDa 
Food security 1.90 1.00 0.64 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 
GHG emissions 1.31 0.60 0.63 0.77 0.59 0.61 0.76 
Agrobiodiversity               
- Semi-natural grassland 0.99 0.04 1.00 1.00 0.08 1.00 1.00 
- HNVF 1.05 1.50 1.05 1.19 1.44 1.07 1.22 
a FS: Food security, BD: Agrobiodiversity, FSBD: Food security and agrobiodiversity 5 
Source: Own calculations. 6 
 7 
The relationship between food security and agrobiodiversity is more complex and 8 
depends on whether the two public goods are addressed jointly.  Sole focus on food security 9 
(FS), where the SMS is binding, results in a semi-natural grassland indicator value far below 10 
one, meaning that there is no strong relationship with semi-natural grassland. On the other 11 
hand, the actual level of High Nature Value Farmland is higher than its SMS, indicating a 12 
positive relationship. Sole focus on agrobiodiversity (BD), where the SMS is binding for 13 
semi-natural grassland, but not for HNVF, indicates some complementarity with food 14 
security, but not enough to achieve the SMS. Although the scenario solution implies that 15 
more than enough protein and fat can be produced during a crisis8, only about sixty percent of 16 
needed calories can be produced. We see the complementarity with respect to grassland, 17 
ruminants and other livestock. However, sole focus on agrobiodiversity implies relatively low 18 
levels of arable land, laying hens and poultry, which are relatively efficient for calorie 19 
                                                          
8 This holds for all SMS-scenarios, so our focus in the rest of the article will be on calorie production when we 
discuss food security 
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production. If food security and agrobiodiversity are addressed jointly (FSBD), both the 1 
SMSs for food security and semi-natural grassland are binding, whereas the SMSs for the 2 
HNVF index and GHG emissions are non-binding. 3 
Looking at how the supply of public goods varies among scenarios, we see that the SMSs 4 
of food security or semi-natural grassland are binding restrictions that will generate shadow 5 
prices. However, when one of these SMSs is binding, the supply of HNVF will be above its 6 
SMS, indicating complementary public goods in this aspect. The conflict between the public 7 
goods lies in supplying semi-natural grassland and supplying food security, at least when 8 
maintaining SMS levels. This conflict has consequences for the shadow prices.  9 
The shadow prices for the SMS illustrate in more detail the relationship between the 10 
public goods (table 4).  11 
 12 
Table 4. Shadow prices for SMS and imputed support in baseline and scenarios  13 
 Baseline Emission cap Emission tax 
  FSa BDa FSBDa FSa BDa FSBDa 
Food securityb   1 545     2 132   1 807     2 101  
Agrobiodiversityc     18 422   22 709     20 655   24 287  
Net supportd   17 002   4 551   4 143   11 322   4 449   3 676   10 511  
- Food securityd    4 551     6 215   5 314     6 192  
- Agrobiodiversityd      4 143   5 107     4 645   5 462  
- GHG emissions taxd          865   969   1 143  
a FS: Food security, BD: Agrobiodiversity, FSBD: Food security and agrobiodiversity.  14 
b NOK per million kcal 15 
c NOK per ha 16 
d million NOK  17 
Source: Own calculations 18 
 19 
The top two lines of table 4 show the shadow prices for achieving the SMSs for food security 20 
and agrobiodiversity, separately and jointly. There is no shadow price for emissions 21 
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reductions, since the restriction requiring a minimum reduction of thirty percent is not 1 
binding in any of the scenarios. We see that at their SMS levels, food security and 2 
agrobiodiversity are conflicting public goods. Supplying an additional “unit of food security” 3 
(a resource base for one million kcal) is more costly when both food security and 4 
agrobiodiversity must be supplied than when food security is supplied alone. The shadow 5 
price for food security is thirty-eight percent higher (emissions cap scenario) and sixteen 6 
percent higher (carbon tax scenario) for joint production, compared to separate production. 7 
We see the same pattern for agrobiodiversity.  8 
Under joint production, the effects on the public goods’ shadow prices are consistent with 9 
the theoretical model in section 3.2. Some of the inputs for producing the different public 10 
goods are substitutes. When comparing scenarios FS and FSBD, we see that the SMS for 11 
semi-natural grassland forces the substitution of more calorie-efficient agricultural inputs, 12 
thus driving up the cost of providing food security. When comparing BD and FSBD, we see 13 
that the SMS on food security drives up the opportunity cost of land, making it more costly to 14 
maintain the SMS for agrobiodiversity. 15 
Since supplying public goods jointly results in higher shadow prices on each public good 16 
compared to when producing them separately, the support requirement for each public good 17 
is higher under joint production. Net support with joint production is about thirty percent 18 
higher than the sum of support from supplying the public goods separately.  19 
The bottom four lines of table 4 show that the total costs of maintaining the SMS in all six 20 
scenarios are lower than the costs in the baseline scenario. This is consistent with Brunstad et 21 
al. (2005), though they found possibilities for greater reductions in agricultural support. They 22 
estimated that one third of current support levels were sufficient to achieve food security and 23 
landscape preservation. We estimate that about sixty-five percent of the baseline net support 24 
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level is necessary to achieve the SMSs. The main reason for these differences in total support 1 
levels is that Brunstad et al. (2005) imposed a looser SMS for food security. 2 
As discussed above, we see from the results that the public goods food security and 3 
agrobiodiversity are conflicting, but we also see that their provision involves some GHG 4 
emissions. In addition, we see that achieving the SMSs for both food security and 5 
agrobiodiversity results in greater emissions than if only one of the SMSs had to be met. If 6 
the emissions cap had been sufficiently more ambitious, emissions reductions would have 7 
had a positive shadow price, and the shadow prices of the other public goods would have 8 
increased. 9 
The theoretical model in section 3 showed that balancing public goods in agriculture 10 
involves complex trade-offs, and the simulations confirm this result.  11 
 12 
Table 7 compares the changes in welfare under the SMS-scenarios to the baseline 13 
scenario. All of the SMS scenarios entail higher consumer surplus, and lower (or unchanged) 14 
producer surplus. In sum, social welfare is 13 per cent - 28 per cent higher in the SMS 15 
scenarios than in the baseline. This is in addition to any social welfare attached to the public 16 
goods and reduced tax burden. 17 
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Table 7. Key indicators  1 
  Baseline Emissions cap Emissions tax 
   FSa BDa FSBDa FSa BDa FSBDa 
Production indexb  100   62   35   71   63   35   72  
Food price indexb  100   57   69   55   58   70   56  
Welfarec  88   113   101   113   113   100   112  
Consumer surplusc  81   106   99   107   106   99   107  
Producer surplusc  7   7   2   5   7   1   5  
a FS: Food security, BD: Agrobiodiversity, FSBD: Food security and agrobiodiversity.  2 
b Baseline = 100 3 
c billion NOK 4 
Source: Own calculations 5 
 6 
Our calculations show that it is possible to simultaneously maintain the safe minimum 7 
standards for both food security and agrobiodiversity and achieve other socio-economic 8 
improvements. These other improvements lead to a forty-two percent decrease in GHG 9 
emissions from Norwegian agricultural production and imports, an increase in the sum of 10 
producer and consumer surplus by twenty-eight percent, and a reduction in the public tax 11 
burden of 6.5 billion NOK per year. These results show that Norwegian agricultural policy is 12 
highly misspecified if the policy goal is to achieve safe minimum standards for public goods 13 
at the lowest social cost. The results suggest major potential for increasing the socio-14 
economic efficiency of Norwegian agricultural policy.  15 
 16 
7. Discussion and outlook 17 
The paper provides clear and intuitive definitions of when SMSs of public goods are 18 
complements or in conflict: if loosening an SMS on one public good raises the marginal 19 
social benefit of loosening the SMS of another public good, the public goods are 20 
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complements. In contrast, if loosening a SMS on one public good lowers the marginal social 1 
benefit of loosening the SMS of another public good, the public goods are conflicting. The 2 
theoretical framework suggests that public goods tend to be conflicting when the inputs for 3 
producing them are substitutes. In such a case, lowering the SMS for one public good will not 4 
only reduce the subsidy requirement for that public good, but also for the other public good, 5 
thus reducing the public’s support burden and the corresponding Harberger-triangles and so 6 
increasing aggregate welfare. When the inputs for producing different public goods are 7 
substitutes, a stricter SMS on one public good, will result in a greater welfare increase from 8 
loosening the other public good’s SMS. 9 
Our application of the theoretical framework to the Norwegian agricultural sector using 10 
the Jordmod model revealed that the relationships between public goods and the private 11 
goods to which they are related can be complex. We therefore argue that general statements 12 
on these relationships are not possible a priori, but require case studies and modelling 13 
activities. Our empirical results largely support the findings of Brunstad et al. (2005): if 14 
Norwegian agricultural policy is redesigned to pursue maintenance of public goods and 15 
reductions of public bads, the need for support is reduced.  16 
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Appendix 1 
Here we prove that the loss in the final-product producer’s profits in figure 2 is area Y plus 2 
area Z. Assume that producers of the final good x use inputs a and b, and buy them for pries 3 
Pa
d, and Pb
d. They receive an exogenously given price Px
0 for their output. The SMS level for 4 
the second public good is h´. The following six equations describe market equilibrium, and 5 
under the conditions of the Implicit Function Theorem implicitly define endogenous variables 6 
Pa
d, Pa
s, Pb
d, Pb
s, sa, and sb as functions of the parameter g: 7 
(A.1) Sa Pa
s( ) =Da Px0,Pad,Pbd( )  8 
(A.2) Sb Pb
s( ) =Db Px0,Pad,Pbd( )  9 
(A.3)  10 
(A.4)  11 
(A.5) Pa
s + sa = Pa
d  12 
(A.6) Pb
s + sb = Pb
d . 13 
Label the six functions thus defined by the parameter g with asterisks: Pa
s* g( ) , … , sb
* g( ) . 14 
Profits of the producers of the final good are defined as  15 
(A.7) P Px
0,Pa
d,Pb
d( ) = Px0Sx Px0,Pad,Pbd( )-PadDa Px0,Pad,Pbd( )-PadDa Px0,Pad,Pbd( ) . 16 
Let parameter g change its value from g´ to g´ - ∆g. Let a path of integration L be defined as 17 
the curve parameterically defined by g, Pa
d* g( ) , Pb
d* g( ) , as g changes from g´ to g´ - ∆g. 18 
Following Kaplan (1984, pp. 291-293), we can write: 19 
(A.8) DP =
¶P Px
0,Pa
d,Pb
d( )
¶Pa
d
dPa
d +
¶P Px
0,Pa
d,Pb
d( )
¶Pb
d
dPb
d
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
L
ò . 20 
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The integral on the right-hand side of (A.8) is a line integral, with L being an arbitrary 1 
piecewise smooth path of integration in , with endpoints PA
d2,PB
d2( )  and PAd3,PBd3( )  (Kaplan 2 
1984, pp. 292-293, especially equation (5.48)). By Hotelling’s lemma, we know, 3 
(A.9) DP = -Da Px
0,Pa
d,Pb
d( )dPad -Db Px0,Pad,Pbd( )dPbd( )
L
ò . 4 
Because path L is an arbitrary one between endpoints PA
d2,PB
d2( )  and PAd3,PBd3( ) , we may 5 
choose the equilibrium price path defined by equations (A.1) – (A.6) as parameter g changes 6 
from g´ to g´ - ∆g. Call this path E. Because prices along path E are market equilibrium 7 
prices, then market clearing implies demand for input b equals the quantity supplied for all 8 
price couples (Pa
d, Pb
d) along E. Therefore we may write, 9 
(A.10) DP = -Da Px
0,Pa
d,Pb
d( )dPad -Sb Pbs( )dPbd( )
E
ò . 10 
Because h remains at h´, the quantity supplied of b is constant at b´ in all the equlibria.  11 
Therefore we may write, 12 
(A.11) DP = - Da Px
0,Pa
d,Pb
d( )dPad
E
ò - b´dPbd
E
ò . 13 
 14 
The first line integral on the right-hand side of (A.11) is the geometric area behind the 15 
equilibrium demand curve Da
* in figure 2, which is area Y (Just et al. 2004: 316-318). The 16 
second integral is simply b´(Pb
d3 – Pbd2), which is area Z.  17 
